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
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LETTER DATED 14 NOVEMBER 1998 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a letter dated 14 November 1998 from Mr. Tariq Aziz, Deputy Prime Minister of the Republic of Iraq, enclosing the decree of the Iraqi leadership regarding the resumption of cooperation with the United Nations Special Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency. These two bodies will be permitted to carry out their regular duties in accordance with the relevant Security Council resolutions and on the basis of the principles stated in the memorandum of understanding signed on 23 February 1998.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nizar HAMDOON
Ambassador
Permanent Representative



Annex

Letter dated 14 November 1998 from the Deputy Prime Minister
of Iraq addressed to the Secretary-General

Your letter of 13 November 1998 addressed to President Saddam Hussein was submitted to a joint meeting, under the chairmanship of the President, of the Revolution Command Council and the National Command of the Arab Ba'ath Socialist Party. I have been entrusted with the task of conveying to you the following response:

1. In adopting its decisions of 5 August and 31 October 1998, Iraq's intention was not to sever the relationship with the Special Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency or to halt implementation of its obligations under section C of Security Council resolution 687 (1991). It was to end the suffering of its people caused by the sanctions and to apply paragraph 22 of resolution 687 (1991) as the first step towards the lifting of the other sanctions.
2. Having confidence in you and your good faith, the Government of Iraq has cooperated positively with your initiative concerning a comprehensive review. Unfortunately, however, the deliberations of the Security Council on the procedure for carrying out the review have not given a clear picture guaranteeing fairness and objectivity in the implementation of the aforementioned paragraph 22, which is the declared goal of the comprehensive review according to your initiative. It is well known that the main reason for that is the position taken by the United States of America, which does not represent the majority opinion in the Security Council, but, contrary to your initiative, persists in opposing the introduction of any clarification with regard to the goal of the comprehensive review.
3. Despite the assurances that we have received from you and many members of the Security Council who support the main objective of the comprehensive review, and regardless of the confidence that we have in you and the majority of those members, and our reliance on your good faith and sincerity, those assurances were not satisfactory to us, since they failed to meet the basic requirements as far as we are concerned.

On the basis of what was stated in your letter, and in appreciation of the contents of the letter from Mr. Boris Yeltsin, President of the Russian Federation, and Mr. Yevgeny Primakov, Prime Minister of the Russian Federation, and the positive positions expressed and conveyed to us by China, France, Brazil and other States, and in order to offer a further opportunity for justice to be achieved by the lifting of the sanctions imposed on Iraq, commencing with implementation of paragraph 22 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991), the leadership of Iraq has decided to resume cooperation with the Special Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency, and to permit them to carry out their regular duties in accordance with the relevant Security Council resolutions and on the basis of the principles agreed in the memorandum of understanding signed with you on 23 February 1998.

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We are not making this opportunity available because we fear the aggressive United States campaign and its threat to launch a new attack against Iraq, but as an expression of our feelings of responsibility, and in response to the appeals made by you and other friends. We affirm that the people of Iraq will not renounce its legitimate right to have the tyrannical sanctions lifted and live a normal life like other peoples of the world. We await with interest the outcome of your endeavours and of the review.

We genuinely believe that if the comprehensive review is not to be merely a formality, and is to be free of the influence of preconceived purposes, the points we conveyed on 13 November 1998 to the ambassadors of the Russian Federation, France and China, a copy of which I have enclosed herewith, will, if adopted, ensure that the review is serious, impartial and productive.

We are confident that you will continue your endeavours to establish the bases and correct procedures for the review, so that it may begin as soon as possible.

(Signed) Tariq AZIZ

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Appendix

- First: In adopting its decisions of 5 August and 31 October 1998, Iraq's intention was not to sever the relationship with the Special Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency or to halt implementation of its obligations under section C of Security Council resolution 687 (1991), and under Security Council resolution 715 (1991).
- Second: Iraq's intention was to end the suffering of its people caused by the sanctions and to apply paragraph 22 of resolution 687 (1991) as the first step towards the lifting of the other sanctions.
- Third: Iraq has expressed its willingness to participate in the comprehensive review proposed by the Secretary-General. However, owing to the pressure brought to bear by the United States, the deliberations of the Security Council have not resulted in any provisions for an impartial and objective review with the aim of implementing paragraph 22.
- Fourth: The Iraqi position with respect to the comprehensive review is set forth below:
1. The comprehensive review should be completed within a very short period (e.g. seven days) once the Special Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency have resumed their regular duties. The review should be carried out with no pre-conditions such as those previously mentioned with regard to the so-called confirmation of Iraq's cooperation.
 2. The review should focus on paragraph 3 of the Secretary-General's concept paper of 5 October 1998 (the three Iraqi questions of 3 August 1998), and emphasize the question of evidence.
 3. The Security Council should be ready to implement paragraph 22 once it has been established that the requirements of section C of resolution 687 (1991) have been fulfilled.
 4. If, after an objective examination of the situation, the Security Council considers that certain actions should be taken, a limited time-frame should be set for their completion. In the interim, the Security Council should implement measures to lift or reduce the sanctions which are commensurate with the requirements of paragraph 22 that have been fulfilled. Thereafter, upon completion of the work required, paragraph 22 should be implemented.
 5. The Security Council should undertake to abide by the legal interpretation of section C of resolution 687 (1991) and no member should impose additional conditions or restrictions on the implementation of paragraph 22.
- Fifth: The second phase of the review should begin only once the first review has been completed.

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- Sixth: The second phase of the review should be restricted to the obligations specified in the clear provisions of the resolutions. No issues other than the legal interpretation of the resolutions should be raised.
- Seventh: The members of the Security Council, and, in particular, the five permanent members, should abide by international law and the relevant Security Council resolutions in all matters pertaining to Iraq.
- Eighth: The question of Butler and the composition of the Special Commission and its practices is extremely important. The Security Council should give it serious consideration in order to ensure future good relations. We hope that this will be done as soon as possible.
- Ninth: It is imperative that these assurances be communicated directly to the leadership in Baghdad either by the Secretary-General or by a Security Council delegation.
